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Abstract—Secure distance measurement and therefore secure
Time-of-Arrival (ToA) measurement is critical for applications
such as contactless payments, passive-keyless entry and start
systems, and navigation systems. This paper initiates the study
of Message Time of Arrival Codes (MTACs) and their security.
MTACs represent a core primitive in the construction of
systems for secure ToA measurement. By surfacing MTACs in
this way, we are able for the first time to formally define the
security requirements of physical-layer measures that protect
ToA measurement systems against attacks. Our viewpoint also
enables us to provide a unified presentation of existing MTACs
(such as those proposed in distance-bounding protocols and in a
secure distance measurement standard) and to propose basic
principles for protecting ToA measurement systems against
attacks that remain unaddressed by existing mechanisms. We
also use our perspective to systematically explore the tradeoffs
between security and performance that apply to all signal
modulation techniques enabling ToA measurements.
1. Introduction
When did the message arrive at the receiver? Can this
estimate of the message arrival time be manipulated, and in
particular by an attacker that controls the communication
channel? In particular, can message advancement and delay
attacks be prevented? This question is at the core of the
problem that distance bounding protocols, secure positioning,
and navigation systems are trying to solve: can we prevent
the attacker from reducing or enlarging the distance that is
measured between the devices? This problem is relevant in
a number of application scenarios: contactless payments [1],
Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems [2]–[5], GNSS (e.g.,
Galileo, GPS) security [6]–[8]. If we could prevent Time of
Arrival (ToA) and therefore distance manipulation attacks,
we could enable many proximity-based applications, from
location-based access control to secure navigation [9], [10].
As a result, many distance bounding protocols have
been proposed and analyzed [11]–[13]. Implementations of
distance bounding protocols have emerged that combine such
protocols with distance measurement techniques [14]–[17],
in particular with UWB 802.15.4 radios [18]–[20].
The main idea behind these solutions is to prevent ToA
manipulation by the randomization of message content.
Namely, it was commonly believed that if the attacker
cannot predict the bits of the messages, then he will not
be able to advance their time of arrival at the receiver.
In [21] the authors argued this to be false – since bits are
encoded into symbols, attackers can advance their arrival
time. Different physical-layer attacks followed also validating
this in practice [3], [22], [23]. This led to the conclusion that
secure distance measurement systems can only be built with
short symbols and using rapid bit exchange [21]. Given the
limits on the output power, such a result would mean that only
short-range systems could be made secure. This was shown
to be incorrect in [24], which showed that longer symbols can
be used if they are interleaved in transmission in a manner
that is unpredictable to the attacker. This further demonstrated
that secure, long-range distance measurement systems are
possible. Recent works further show that, under certain
conditions, distance enlargement can also be detected [25].
All these works showed that consideration of the details
of how bits are encoded into symbols (i.e., modulation) is
crucial in the design of secure distance measurement systems.
This discussion leads to the following questions:
Can we construct a generic message to symbol encoding
that prevents any message advancement/reduction (and there-
fore distance delay/enlargement) for symbols of arbitrary
lengths (and therefore arbitrary measurement ranges)?
Can we derive the main principles for the design of such
encodings?
In this work, we show that answering these questions
is indeed possible. To do so, we introduce Message Time
Of Arrival Codes (MTACs), a new class of cryptographic
primitive that allows receivers to verify if an adversary has
manipulated the message arrival time. In a similar way that
Message Authentication Codes protect message integrity,
MTACs preserve the integrity of message arrival times. They
are, therefore, fundamental to any protocol that relies on Time
of Arrival information, such as clock synchronization [26],
distance measurement [27] and positioning protocols [28]–
[31].
In the same sense that bits can be encrypted with a
shared key, the shape of a signal can also be hidden by
masking it with a random fast-changing sequence. However,
to verify a signal shape, a receiver has to aggregate the signal
over a considerable time interval in order to capture enough
energy. This is especially so when sender and receiver are
separated by longer distances. If the attacker knows the
temporal alignment of those aggregations with the signal,
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
11
05
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
5 N
ov
 20
19
he can hide his guessing errors in the null space of the
(linear) aggregation function. Simple signal masking is,
therefore, not sufficient for the protection against distance
manipulation attacks. To address this problem, in addition
to using cryptographically-secured modulation (i.e., signal
generation), an MTAC also performs cryptographic checks
of the consistency of the modulation at the receiver.
We give a formal definition of MTACs and their security.
We provide the main principles for the design of these
codes. We review existing secure distance measurement
schemes and draft standards and show how they fit within our
MTAC definitions. We then introduce a new Variance-Based
MTAC that is inspired by our design principles. We show
that adhering to these principles allows protection against
physical-layer distance-reducing attacks over a wide, realistic
performance region. We systematically explore the trade-off
between performance and security in ranging.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce physical-layer attacks against distance
measurement. Section 3 then contains the formal security
definitions. Section 4 explores attack strategies. In Section 5,
we go over existing proposals. After that, we propose a
Variance-Based MTAC in Section 6, which we underline
with simulations in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2. Background: Secure Distance Measurement
In this section, we introduce different RF techniques for
distance measurement and highlight the challenges towards
securing such systems against physical-layer attacks.
2.1. Distance Measurement Techniques and Stan-
dards
Establishing location or proximity both require estimating
the physical distance between two or more wireless entities.
Numerous wireless ranging and localization techniques have
emerged in the last decade. Some of these observe physical
properties of the signal such as RSSI [32] or phase [33] that
change as a function of propagation. However, both these
properties can be controlled by an attacker that relays the
signal and modifies them to fit another distance claim [34],
[35]. The only signal property that cannot be reliably
controlled by an attacker is its time-of-flight (ToF). More
precisely, an attacker cannot reduce ToF, as a signal cannot
traverse space faster than the speed of light.
For ToF measurements, ultra-wideband impulse radio
(UWB-IR) has emerged as a prominent technique for precise
ranging. It allows high operating distances despite power con-
straints by transmitting multi-pulse symbols. UWB-IR rang-
ing is in the process of being standardized in IEEE 802.15.4z
and is becoming commercially available [18]–[20].
2.2. Distance-Bounding Protocols
Distance-bounding protocols that rely on ToF measure-
ments, as provided by UWB-IR, are the cornerstone for
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Figure 1. While distance-bounding protocols may be considered secure at
the bit-level, systems can still be vulnerable at the physical layer. Distance-
bounding protocols that rely on performant (i.e., long-distance), deterministic
modulations are vulnerable to ED/LC attacks, as shown in the lower part of
the figure. The underlying cause is time-redundant encoding for performance.
secure proximity verification and positioning. As shown
in Figure 1, the basic idea behind such applications is as
follows: a prover first commits to a cryptographic nonce;
when triggered by receipt of a challenge message from
the verifier, the prover sends the nonce, and then sends an
opening of its commitment; verification is deemed successful
if the commitment opens correctly to the nonce obtained
at the verifier. ToF is bounded at the verifier by the time
difference between sending the trigger signal and it starting
to receive the nonce.
Existing vulnerabilities are related to the time-critical
aspects of such a protocol, namely adjudging exactly when
the nonce starts to be received at the verifier. This is relevant
even when secret-dependent masked waveforms are used.
It is therefore essential that both the secret information
content and its time of arrival are carefully tested. Earlier
instantiations of distance-bounding protocols relied on a
rapid bit-exchange [16] to check both the content and timing
of each bit of the nonce in consecutive rounds. As this
requires each symbol to be short, this does not scale to
longer distances. A distance commitment [16] can be used to
decouple time acquisition from content verification. However,
there are still doubts about the security level of the content
verification, due to targeted attacks on the modulation [21].
2.3. Physical-Layer Attacks
Physical-layer attacks that target the underlying mod-
ulation cannot be addressed solely by distance-bounding
protocols. In the following, we do not consider attacks that
can be averted by conservative signal acquisition (Cicada
attack [36]) or involve denial of service (overshadowing,
jamming). Instead, we address distance manipulation attacks
that exploit redundancies in the modulation, and that are
not easily averted by security-aware configuration choices
of existing receivers.
Early-Detect, Late-Commit (ED/LC) attack. This attack
reduces the distance measured by preemptively injecting
a non-committal waveform that triggers an early signal
detection at the receiver [21], [22]. The goal is to cause
the receiver to register an earlier time of arrival, which,
however, the attacker cannot back with knowledge about
actual signal content. We illustrate this attack in the lower
part of Figure 1. The attacker gets away with this attack due
to non-idealities of the legitimate receiver, requiring it to
integrate signal power over time for each bit-wise decision,
effectively limiting its resolution. To compensate for early
deviations from the legitimate symbol (i.e., guessing errors),
the attacker significantly amplifies his signal towards the end
of each symbol. For maximum effect (distance reduction),
the attacker sends the committal, information-bearing part as
late as possible after the start of the injected signal. Ideally,
this is done to precisely coincide with the start time of the
legitimate signal so that the attacker can “copy” it’s content
(with amplification). An ED/LC attack can be executed fully
deterministically and can lead to a distance reduction up to
the product of the symbol duration and the speed of light.
Guessing attacks. If the polarity of individual pulses making
up a modulated symbol does not only depend on the bit-value
of the symbol, e.g., by being fully randomized as in [24],
the attacker can resort to a probabilistic ED/LC attack, i.e.,
a guessing attack. Here, the attacker tries to guess signal
components in advance in order to reduce the measured
distance. As in an ED/LC attack, the attacker exploits signal
redundancies that are required for robust signal reception. The
basic idea is that the attacker can compensate early guessing
errors by using more power towards the end of the symbol.
For each symbol, the attacker can, for instance, double the
power as long as his guesses are wrong and stop interfering
as soon as a pulse is guessed correctly. This power-increase
attack is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
2.4. Secure Distance Measurement Solutions
There has been a proposal addressing the outlined threats
by cryptographically hiding the bit-wise aggregations in a
UWB-based On-Off Keying (OOK) modulation [24]. The
authors provide concrete security levels for selected attacker
models. A second approach is to correlate an incoming
signal, a so-called Scrambled Timestamp Sequence (STS),
with the expected signal shape and locking to the peak [37].
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no estimate of the
concrete security offered by the latter method. In contrast
to both proposals, our work establishes the security goal of
any such approach on a fundamental level and outlines a
solution permitting to a more general attacker and a broader
performance region. We come back to the relation between
our work and these existing schemes in Section 5.
3. Message Time of Arrival Codes
In this section, we introduce Message Time of Arrival
Codes (MTACs), physical-layer message codes that allow
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Figure 2. Under noisy conditions, the receiver has to combine multiple
short-term signal contributions (samples) to retrieve information. (c′ ∗ p)
denotes linear aggregation, e.g., through a matched filter.
the receiver to verify the message time of arrival securely.
Such codes preserve the legitimate signal time of arrival
under an adversary that tries to “shift” the signal in time,
i.e., aim to create the impression of a different arrival
time. Fundamentally, the adversarial behavior can be either
directed towards producing the code at a time earlier than its
legitimate appearance (advancement) or to erase any evidence
of a signal, thus opening the possibility for a late imitation
(delay). In the following definitions, we divide the problem
along those two threats. Although we provide definitions for
both threats, we focus on their use in preventing message
advancement (i.e., distance reduction) attacks. Preventing
such attacks is necessary for the security of all secure distance
measurement systems. A system performing secure time of
arrival measurement might in practice use separate codes to
protect against advancement and delay attacks.
Prior to the definitions, we briefly go over boundary
conditions on our proposal, stemming from requirements on
precision and performance of wireless ranging signals.
3.1. System and Attacker Model
We can model any ranging signal as consisting of
short-time signal contributions (i.e., pulses) that carry the
information used for precise ranging. As shown in Figure 2,
linear combinations of these pulses provide the statistics for
the detection of information bits at the receiver. This model
covers a broad range of modulation schemes.
Modulation. In the following, we state some assumptions
on the modulation. Following Kerckhoffs’ principle, we
assume the attacker to be aware of all of these aspects
of the modulation.
• The modulation consists of a series of elementary,
short-time signal contributions called pulses. The
effect of ED/LC attacks on such individual signal
contributions is considered insignificant (say, less
than 1m) in a sufficiently wideband system. We refer
to the amplitude level of such a pulse as a sample.
• For performance-related considerations, we assume
the pulses to be sufficiently spaced such that there
is no inter-pulse-interference in the given channel.
• Each information bit is encoded in a symbol con-
sisting of nppb pulses (and samples). The value
of nppb is chosen in compliance with a target
performance level p within a performance region
P = [0,BERmax]× [0, dmax]× [0,Γmax], defined
by intervals bounded by the maximally tolerated bit
error rate BERmax, the maximum communication
distance dmax as well as the maximum NLoS signal
attenuation Γmax.
• Bits are grouped together to form frames, and each
frame consists of np pulses (and hence np/nppb bits).
Receiver Demodulation. We assume the receiver demodu-
lates by aggregating nppb samples using correlation with
a polarity1 mask that fits the corresponding hypothesis
for each possible value of the information bit. Then, a
binary hypothesis test is applied to recover each bit. This
is illustrated in Figure 2. We assume an AWGN2 channel
model without inter-pulse interference. In general, the bit
error rate (BER) at the receiver is therefore given by the tail
bound on the Gaussian distribution, i.e.
BER = Q
(√
nppbPrx
σ2n
)
, (1)
under Gaussian thermal noise with variance σ2n = bW ·N0,
where N0 is the noise power spectral density at room
temperature, bW is the system bandwidth and Prx is the
receiver-side signal power. Figure 2 highlights the effect of
larger nppb (longer symbols) on BER. This is to highlight
the beneficial effect of temporal diversity on performance.
Although Equation 1 refers to a BSPK modulation, this effect
extends to other modulation techniques. We note that, within
this model, for any channel and target BER, there exists
an adequate symbol length and assume that the receiver
chooses the symbol length accordingly. In this work, we do
not assume any (error-correcting) coding.
Attacker Model. We assume that the attacker fully controls
the communication channel and has no limitations on how
fast she can process messages and react to them. She is,
therefore, able to detect individual samples ideally. As a
consequence, the attacker’s information advantage increases
as the channel for legitimate communication worsens, e.g.,
due to increased distance. We consider two distinct attack
models capturing distance reduction (message advancement)
and distance enlargement (message delay). In the case of
the distance reduction attacker, we pose no restriction on
the attacker’s abilities regarding the speed of computation,3
location, or control of the communication channel (e.g., we
give the attacker the ability to record and reactively inject
messages on the channel with negligible delay). The only
restriction that we pose is that the attacker cannot transmit
information faster than the speed of light. The attacker’s
sampling rate needs to be sufficient to recover the signal.
1. Polarity refers to one of two possible phase values of the sample.
2. Additive White Gaussian Noise.
3. Although MTACs can be constructed so as to be information-
theoretically secure, most practical schemes will require that the attacker is
computationally restricted.
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Figure 3. Ideal instantiations of distance reduction (left) and distance
enlargement (right) attacks. Both attacks are less likely to be detected
the better an attacker can guess the legitimate signal shape. This holds both
for releasing an early version (reduction) and for covertly annihilating the
valid signal (enlargement).
For an attack to be effective, we don’t need to assume that
the attacker has a higher bandwidth since we assume the
attacker can precisely synchronize to the start of the signal.
For the distance enlargement attacker, we assume that the
attacker is constrained in terms of location, computation and
control of the environment such that she is only able to block
the reception of samples if she can anticipate their polarity.
However, this includes attackers that operate with multiple
(smart) antennas or increase noise levels at the legitimate
receiver
Visualising Attacks. In Figure 3, we illustrate ideal in-
stantiations of distance modification attacks. Testing for a
distance reduction attack at the receiver consists of a single
hypothesis test: either the signal is real (i.e., only distorted
by channel) or it is attacker-generated (i.e., it is distorted in a
way that indicates that many pulses were guessed wrongly).
An attacker is successful if he can produce the expected
signal earlier. Verifying existence or absence of a distance
enlargement attack, however, involves a multi-hypothesis test
in time: the receiver has to check whether a given version
of the signal is the first occurrence of its kind or if there
exists an earlier, potentially degraded, version sufficiently
similar to the legitimate signal. Consequently, in both attacks,
an attacker’s success chances are higher the better he can
anticipate the legitimate signal shape.
3.2. Definitions
A Message Time of Arrival Code (MTAC) is intended
to allow detection of any kind of physical-layer distance-
modifying attack with high likelihood.
Definition 1 A message time of arrival code (MTAC) is
a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen,
Mtac, Vrfy), such that:
1) The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input
the security parameter n and outputs a key k with
|k| = n.
2) The code-generation algorithm Mtac takes as input
a key k and a message m ∈ {0, 1}nb and outputs
a real-valued vector c = (c1, . . . , cnp). Since this
algorithm may be randomized, we write this as
c← Mtack(m).
3) The verification algorithm Vrfy takes as input a
key k, a real-valued vector c′ of length np, and
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Figure 4. The wireless channel poses a fundamental indirection between
the security parameter and the achievable security level. The detectable
information rate at the receiver is smaller than the security parameter per
second at the transmitter. The particular ratio Rout/Rin = 1/nppb results
from the modulation and reflects both a performance goal and the channel
quality.
message m′. It outputs a bit b. We assume that Vrfy
is deterministic, and so write b := Vrfyk(m
′, c′).
In the above definition, we assume that m may be
transmitted separately from c; however c can also ‘carry’ m,
which case we assume the existence of an efficient algorithm
to extract m from c. In this situation, we can also assume that
m′ can be extracted from c′ and could choose to suppress
it as an input to Vrfy . The value of b output by Vrfy is
intended to convey that message time of arrival is correct
(b = 1) or that it cannot be securely verified (b = 0).
An MTAC can be seen as a keyed signal verification
scheme that guarantees the integrity of the message time-of-
arrival. c = (c1, . . . , cnp) is a vector of samples correspond-
ing to the digital representation of the analog signal after A/D
conversion. We make no assumptions on the confidentiality
or authenticity of m. We assume that these can be achieved
through other means, e.g., using encryption or message
authentication codes.
Before information can be verified, it has to be trans-
mitted over a wireless channel and detected by the receiver.
Strictly speaking, Vrfy involves not only verification but
also time-selective detection of physical-layer information.
As highlighted in Figure 4, detection performance and the
resulting security level are fundamentally connected. In
general, received samples c′ are affected by channel noise
and, in consequence, not identical to c. The detection rate
Rout, which depends on channel and modulation, is the rate
of verifiable information at the receiver. Due to temporal
aggregation, it is, in general, smaller than the input data
rate, i.e., Rout ≤ Rin. Within our assumptions, the ratio
Rin/Rout is given by nppb. Moreover, detection of this
information over a channel is error-prone, which is reflected
by a nonzero BER. Consequently, an MTAC will have a non-
zero likelihood of false negatives, as well. This we address
in a verification criterion that we call robustness.
Definition 2 An MTAC is robust if
1) In the absence of an attacker, for any channel, Vrfy
applied on c′ is falsely negative with probability at
most 1− (1−BER)nb , where BER is the error rate
in detecting the bits carried by c.
This means that the false negative rate should remain bounded
by the frame error rate on the bit level. Note that we will
impose robustness only on detection of distance advancement.
As mentioned earlier, detection of delay attacks involves a
multi-hypothesis test in time and is, therefore, inherently
more prone to false positives.
Distance modification can mean either distance reduction
or distance enlargement. The former requires the attacker to
advance the signal in time, the latter to delay the signal in
time. We define two different MTAC security models, one
for each type of attack (a single model would be unwieldy
and difficult to use).
MTAC-A: Modelling Advancement Attacks. In what fol-
lows, α ≥ 0 denotes the observation delay of the adversary,
measured in samples, representing how long it takes for an
attacker to observe and react to a given sample.4 On the
other hand, δ ≥ 1 denotes the number of samples by which
the adversary tries to advance the signal, quantifying its
attack goal. Informally, we allow the adversary access to
MTAC code values c for message inputs of its choice in
a fully adaptive manner. Then we challenge it to produce
an “advanced” signal c′ for a message m of its choice.
We model the latter by requiring the adversary to produce
component c′i+δ of its output before being given samples
(c1, . . . , ci−α) of c = Mtack(m). The adversary wins if it
eventually produces a vector c′ for which Vrfyk(m, c
′) = 1.
An MTAC scheme is (informally speaking) secure against
advancement attacks if the probability that any efficient
adversary wins is small.
We formalise these ideas in terms of a message time-
of-arrival forgery experiment Mtac-A-forgeA,Π(n). In this
experiment:
1) The experiment sets k ← Gen(n).
2) The adversary A is given oracle access to Mtack();
let Q of size q denote the set of queries made by
A.
3) A outputs m, and the experiment sets c =
Mtack(m).
4) A then sequentially outputs real values c′1, . . . , c
′
np ;
however, after outputting c′i+δ−1 (and before out-
putting c′i+δ), A is given the samples (c1, . . . , ci−α)
of c.
5) Let c′ denote (c′1, . . . , c
′
np). Then the output of the
experiment is defined to be 1 (and A is said to win)
if and only if (1) Vrfyk(m, c
′) = 1 and (2) m /∈ Q.
Otherwise, the output of the experiment is defined
to be 0.
Note that for schemes in which a message m′ (possibly
different from m) can be extracted from c′, we can define
a different win condition: (1) Vrfyk(m
′, c′) = 1 and (2)
m′ /∈ Q. Here, A still outputs a message m for which she
receives a delayed version of c = Mtack(m), but she can
win by “forging” a code vector c′ for a different message
m′ altogether.
Definition 3 Let Π = {Gen,Mtac,Vrfy} be an MTAC-A,
and let A be an adversary with observation delay α and
4. Although in our attacker model, we pose no restriction on the
adversary’s abilities to reactively record and inject samples, α allows us to
model weaker attackers whose reaction speed is bounded.
tt'
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Figure 5. Distance reducing attack. The attacker sees the legitimate signal
with an observation delay of α samples and sends his guess δ samples ahead
of the actual signal. If successful, the attacker can reduce the measured
distance between key and car by δ samples.
advancement goal δ that makes at most q queries to its MTAC
oracle and that runs in time at most t (across all steps of
the Mtac-A-forgeA,Π(n) experiment). The advantage of A
is then defined as:
AdvMTAC−AA,Π (n) := Pr[Mtac-A-forgeA,Π(n) = 1].
We associate with Π an insecurity function
AdvMTAC−AΠ (·, ·, ·, ·, ·), defined as:
AdvMTAC−AΠ (q, t, α, δ, n) := max
A
{AdvMTAC−AA,Π (n)}
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries with
observation delay α, advancement goal δ, making at most q
queries to its MTAC oracle and running in time at most t.
It is not hard to see that, with all other parameters fixed,
the insecurity function is maximised w.r.t. α and δ when
α = 0 and δ = 1. This corresponds to the situation where
the adversary has no observation delay and is given the
next sample ci from c immediately after outputting its own
guess c′i. The latter corresponds to an adversary who tries
to advance the signal by one pulse.
MTAC-D: Modelling Delay Attacks. In the following, we
consider an adversary interested in removing all traces of
the legitimate signal to perform a delay attack. Under the
condition that all evidence of the legitimate signal is removed,
the adversary can trivially achieve any delay goal δ without
a risk of detection. As the value of δ does not help or limit
the adversary, we are not using it in the model. However,
by limiting the observation delay α ≥ 0, we constrain the
attacker in its ability to observe (and suppress) the samples
that are transmitted by the legitimate transmitter. Generally,
we assume that the attacker will not be able to detect the
legitimate sample, transmit an opposite sample and thus
suppress the legitimate sample. Informally, we allow the
adversary access to MTAC code values c for message inputs
of its choice in a fully adaptive manner. Then, we challenge
it to produce an “advanced” signal c′ for the message m of
its choice. We model the latter by requiring the adversary
to produce component c′i of its output before being given
samples (c1, . . . , ci−α) of c = Mtack(m), i.e., the adversary
needs to produce at least one sample in advance for α = 0.
The adversary wins if it eventually produces a vector c′ for
which Vrfyk(m, c
′′) = 0 for c′′ := c + c′. Vrfyk(m, c
′′)
outputs 0 if it does not find a trace of c in c′′ and is unable
to detect the existence of c′.
We formalise these ideas in terms of a message time-
of-arrival forgery experiment Mtac-D-forgeA,Π(n) . In this
experiment:
1) The experiment sets k ← Gen(n).
2) The adversary A is given oracle access to Mtack();
let Q of size q denote the set of queries made by
A.
3) A outputs m, and the experiment sets c =
Mtack(m).
4) A then sequentially outputs real values c′1, . . . , c
′
np ;
however, after outputting c′i (and before outputting
c′i+1), A is given the samples (c1, . . . , ci−α) of c.
Samples ci and c′i arrive at the receiver at same
time, resulting in the superposition c′′i = ci + c
′
i.
5) Let c′′ denote (c′′1 , . . . , c
′′
np). Then the output of the
experiment is defined to be 1 (and A is said to win)
if and only if (1) Vrfyk(m, c
′′) = 0 and (2) m /∈ Q.
Otherwise, the output of the experiment is defined
to be 0.
Definition 4 Let Π = {Gen,Mtac,Vrfy} be an MTAC-D,
and let A be an adversary with observation delay α that
makes at most q queries to its MTAC oracle and that runs in
time at most t (across all steps of the Mtac-D-forgeA,Π(n)
experiment). The advantage of A is then defined as:
AdvMTAC−DA,Π (n) := Pr[Mtac-D-forgeA,Π(n) = 1].
We associate with Π an insecurity function
AdvMTAC−DΠ (·, ·, ·, ·), defined as:
AdvMTAC−DΠ (q, t, α, n) := max
A
{AdvMTAC−DA,Π (n)}
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries with
observation delay α, making at most q queries to its MTAC
oracle and running in time at most t.
With all parameters fixed, the insecurity function is
maximized for α = 0. This corresponds to the situation
when an attacker’s observation delay is limited due to its
position or hardware capabilities such that he cannot detect
the legitimate sample and suppress them when they are
already being transmitted. However, he can observe sample
ci from c immediately after outputting its own guess c′i.
Practical MTAC instantiations are likely to rely on a
scheme to expand some finite sequence of ideal randomness
into a longer one, e.g., using PRFs. We note that, in practice,
this is the component vulnerable to higher values of q and t.
On the other hand, the security of the verification does not
necessarily depend on q and t, i.e., is not affected by those
under the assumption of ideal randomness going into signal
generation. This is equivalent to stating that verification is
not necessarily randomized (beyond the randomness in the
signal). However, verification has to be reliable given some,
within the computational model bounded, knowledge of the
attacker about the PRF output used for signal generation.
4. MTAC Design Space
In this section, we shift to a statistical viewpoint on the
design space of secure MTAC schemes and explain how this
approach relates to the computational model presented earlier.
A statistical analysis entails the advantage of summarizing
the infinite number of possible attack strategies. This is par-
ticularly beneficial because legitimate as well as adversarial
signals can assume uncountably many realizations due to their
real-valued nature and due to the uncertainty introduced by
noise. Moreover, an attacker is free to choose any amplitude
level for each sample of the transmitted signal. The resulting
complexity does not allow a straightforward evaluation of
all possible strategies in a closed-form computational setting.
Also, the security of the verification procedure itself is best
analyzed in information-theoretic terms, since verification
itself does not have to be randomized, i.e., its security is
not necessarily limited to a bounded adversary. Therefore,
we present a signal theoretic approach to evaluate different
designs of MTACs and argue about the distinguishability of
legitimate and attack signals in statistical terms. Although
such an approach does not support explicit bounds, we
can encapsulate the infinite number of attack strategies and
quantify their success in a holistic way. We compare different
signals using both, distance on the bit level (Hamming
distance) and distance on the sample level (L2-distance),
which is motivated by the fact that attack success directly
depends on the receiver’s inability to distinguish an attacker’s
guessing error from noise.
Using our statistical model, we identify the symbol-wise
mean5 and (residual) variance as the two main axes of
optimization in any attack. We then derive meaningful over-
approximations for these two properties that a successful
attack signal needs to exhibit and define a strong attacker
that will form the basis for the analysis in Section 7
4.1. Distance-reducing attacker
We ignore for a moment that the attacker has to provide
a bit sequence that is accepted by the receiver and assume
that the adversarial message passes bit-level verification.
In that case, detecting a distance-reducing attacker means
distinguishing adversarial guessing errors from benign noise
on the sample level.
To formulate such a test, we model noise and attacker
error as stochastic processes N and A. The noise process
N is i.i.d. Gaussian (AWGN channel), an assumption that
holds as long as signal modulation places samples/pulses
reasonably far apart to avoid inter-pulse interference. The
attacker process A, on the other hand, reflects the errors
produced by the strategy to guess c. An attacker can freely
choose the amplitude of its signal based on any strategy,
however, A is random w.r.t. the polarity of the adversarial
samples since the attacker has to guess each sample of c.
We can capture this in the following hypothesis test:
5. With mean we refer to the accumulated statistics per symbol after
inner product with the expected polarity sequence.
H0 : r ∼ N
H1 : r ∼ A+N
For each time j (corresponding to one sample), the noise
process is distributed as N[j] ∼ N (0, σn), the attacker
residual as A[j] ∼ Aj(A), for an attack strategy A. The best
strategy is the one for which the hypothesis test distinguishing
A from N fails with the highest likelihood.
Together with the bit-level requirement that we have so
far ignored, we can now formulate any attacker’s universal
goals as:
1) Create the correct bits: In order to achieve correct
detection of each bit, the attacker needs to shift the
signal mean µb′i w.r.t. the polarity sequence of each
symbol i ∈ {1, . . . , nb} beyond the sensitivity of
the receiver.
2) Minimize the error energy: The attacker aims to
minimize the residual energy, i.e., the variance of
his error distribution Aj at any time j.
3) Make the error as indistinguishable from noise
as possible: The attacker aims to hide in the
noise the unavoidable6 guessing error, i.e., to bring
the distribution Aj close to the legitimate noise
distribution N (0, σn).
Goal 1 targets correctness on the bit level, whereas
Goals 2 and 3 are about indistinguishability of the guessed
signal from the expected signal on the physical layer. As
we will show, for Goal 2, there exists a clear relation to the
hardness of guessing each signal sample of c.
In the presented statistical model, achieving all three goals
together represents a sufficient condition for attack success,
irrespective of potential countermeasures (i.e., detection
techniques). There are different ways an attacker can go
about these goals: an attacker can (1) select the subset
of samples/pulses she wants to interfere with, (2) choose
arbitrary amplitude levels for each targeted pulse, and (3)
decide how many samples need to be observed before
interfering. A meaningful attack strategy will be concerned
with how to make these choices in order to satisfy all three
goals jointly.
We now describe two general concepts that guide any attack
strategy and lead to the definition of a strong attacker by
over-approximating signal mean and residual energy.
Steering the mean: Power-increase strategy. Even if the
signal is fully randomized at the pulse level, an attacker can
guess symbols by employing a power-increase strategy as
shown in Figure 6. Fundamentally, pulse level randomization
under sample-level feedback does not keep an attacker from
steering his signal to an arbitrarily high mean under inner
product with the hidden polarity sequence. An attacker starts
by sending a pulse containing the entire symbol power. He
will keep on doubling the power per pulse until he guesses
6. Since being related to the underlying hardness of guessing the pulses
correctly.
tt
b1
b1 b2 b3
b2 b3
Figure 6. Even under a fully randomized pulse sequence holds: If the receiver
(i.e., verifier) combines the pulses to symbols in a predictable manner, the
attacker has high chances of getting a sufficiently high symbol-wise mean,
by increasing the power in reaction to wrong polarity guesses.
a pulse of the symbol correctly. This attack succeeds with
probability 1− 0.5nppb per symbol. The core takeaway from
this attack is that a sample-level guessing error of the attacker
does not necessarily translate to a bit-level error, due to the
dimensionality reduction applied at the receiver. As long as
the attacker can hide the error in the null space of this linear
transformation, there is no incentive against the attacker
using progressively higher energy levels to ’force’ the bits.
This means, Goal 1, in isolation, is easy to achieve for an
attacker. However, achieving the goal with high likelihood,
i.e., more attempts, is associated with higher power levels,
which puts Goals 2 and 3 in increasing jeopardy.
Minimizing guessing error by learning pulse polarities.
Goals 2 and 3 are directly related to the pulse-guessing
performance of the attacker. Depending on how the infor-
mation bits are modulated, the attacker can potentially use
bit-level information to infer the signal or rely on knowledge
of past pulses to anticipate the pulse polarities ahead. This
would reduce the guessing error and make it harder to detect
the attack. Our attacker, as introduced in Section 3.2 has
full knowledge about the transmitted bits. In general, any
unmasked signal redundancy in time can potentially help
the attacker. An example of this is repetition coding or bit-
level error-correction coding (ECC) as used in the coherent
mode of IEEE 802.15.4z HRP [37]. Also, nonidealities in
the underlying PRF can help an attacker.
A strong attacker. We abstract away from all possible
strategies and only describe the attack signal statistically
subject to an over-approximation of its properties that are
linked to the attacker’s success: signal mean7 and residual
energy (i.e., residual variance).
As will be motivated, residual variance emerges as
observable under a maximum entropy assumption on the
attacker’s strategy. A result from information theory states
that the Kullback-Leibler divergence (i.e., relative entropy)
determines the exponent of the error in distinguishing two
statistical distributions [38]. Consequently, an attacker that
brings its residual closest to the legitimate signal is the
7. i.e., the inner product with the expected polarity sequence. Correct
guesses contribute to it, wrong guesses diminish it.
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Figure 7. Attacker’s strategy space. An attacker needs to exceed a certain
symbol-wise mean to produce the correct bits a the receiver. This he can
achieve with high likelihood using a power-increase strategy. However, there
does not exist any reliable strategy for decreasing the normalized error
variance. An attacker can only do so by maintaining an edge in guessing
pulse polarities. This we model by over-approximating the attacker, e.g.,
by giving him a pulse-guessing bias ρ.
strongest. Therefore, we can define the strongest attacker Aˆ
as the one that is closest in the KL-sense over all times:
Aˆ := arg max
A
Adv(A)
= arg min
A
np∑
j=1
DKL(Aj(A) +N ‖ N )
= arg min
A
min
j
np DKL(Aj(A) +N ‖ N )
= arg min
A
DKL(A(A) +N ‖ N )
The strategy that produces the smallest statistical distance at
any j can be converted into the best strategy over the entire
signal, by applying the same technique at any other time,
since the noise is i.i.d. Therefore, we argue that the attacker
that is locally optimal at any time is also optimal over the
entire process. The strongest attacker is, therefore, the one
that can produce a residual distribution A+N (0, σn) that
has smallest relative entropy compared to the legitimate noise
distribution N (0, σn). Under the condition that the attacker’s
error has nonzero energy, the process A that minimizes
relative entropy to the AWGN only is also a Gaussian.
Therefore, as an over-approximation, we can model the
attacker residual signal process as normally (i.e., maximum
entropy) distributed stochastic process with zero mean and
a variance given by the pulse-level guessing performance,
which we over-approximate. This is equivalent to assuming
maximum ignorance about the attacker’s process beyond the
existence of some residual energy. Under these conditions,
e.g. from [39], we know that the signal energy is a sufficient
statistic for distinguishing two i.i.d. N (0, σ1), N (0, σ2)-
distributed processes.
Observation 1 The signal residual variance constitutes a
sufficient statistic for detection of a guessing attack with a
maximum-entropy residual under AWGN noise.
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Figure 8. We model two different over-approximations for the attacker’s
error variance level: An ideal bias, where an attacker knows a fraction ρ
of the pulse polarities and a non-ideal bias, where we give the attacker a
bound l on the number of power levels for a successful power-increase
attack.
Basing the classification on the residual energy is optimal if
we can extract the attacker’s error perfectly and within the
assumptions, we can universally impose on the attacker’s
error process (i.e., being close to satisfying the three goals). A
practical attacker will likely deviate from these assumptions,
but in ways that add distinctive properties (i.e., non-zero
higher moments) to the residual distribution. Conversely, an
attacker that gets mean and variance right will win.
Observation 2 The attacker getting the mean per bit right
and minimizing signal residual variance together constitute
a sufficient condition for attack success.
We have seen that, without countermeasures, a power-
increase strategy leads to a guessing bias in the receiver-side
security parameter (i.e., the bits). As an over-approximation
for the course of a power-increase strategy, we can tilt the
guessing performance in the attacker’s favor on the pulse
level. For instance, we can assume that the attacker never
makes a wrong guess twice in a row. This means, after at most
two interferences (i.e., pulses), the attacker is guaranteed to
have made a positive net contribution to the receive statistics.
We refer to this attacker as having a non-ideal bias of l = 2
and illustrate it in Figure 8. There, we contrast it to an
ideally-biased attacker, which knows a given fraction ρ of
pulses.
In Figure 7, we highlight the two-dimensional nature of
the attack strategy. It is easy for an attacker to steer the mean
by varying his energy levels, i.e., to move along the x-axis.
However, he cannot control the error variance at the same
time. So, any practical attacker strategy will be concerned
with trading off those two goals. Providing the attacker an
ideal bias results in a diagonal towards the desired spot of
high mean and low variance. In addition, as part of any
over-approximation, we assume the attacker to be successful
regarding the mean (e.g., through a power-increase strategy).
This means the attacker can move arbitrarily on the x-axis. In
the following, we motivate a specific over-approximation for
the error variance, i.e., the attacker’s position on the y-axis.
Observation 3 For an attacker, reducing the signal error
variance, while increasing its mean, is ’pulse-guessing-
hard’. This means, without a systematic guessing bias,
the (normalized) error variance is bound to increase in
a guessing attack.
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2 /
2
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2 /
2
Figure 9. Normalized error variance vs. mean under over-approximation
(blue) and continued interference (dashed lines). The goal of the attacker
is to get mean to 1 while minimizing variance. Given an ideal bias above
a certain threshold (ρcont ≈ 0.2), an attacker has nothing to gain from
continued interference. The dashed lines show the 0.1th percentile of the
variance for unbiased (left) and non-ideally (l = 2) biased (right) guessing
continuation.
In Figure 9, we display simulation results underlining
this. The results show the normalized residual energy of
an ideally-biased attacker (blue line) as a function of the
number of interferences, as well as the effect of continued
interference without bias (left) and with a non-ideal bias
(right). Without bias, the normalized variance is (mostly)
monotonically increasing, converging to its maximum value
of 1. With a non-ideal bias, the gain that can be maintained
is limited. Even with such a consistent bias, only at low
values for ρ is there any incentive to continue interfering.
Especially, for ρ > 0.2, there is no incentive to continue,
even with a consistent but non-ideal bias.
Observation 4 Once the attacker has succeeded in shifting
the mean for all symbols, there is (almost) no utility in
continued interference, unless the attacker has a lasting
pulse-guessing bias. But even then we can find an ideal bias
ρcont, such that there is no utility.
We see in Figure 9 that persistent interference with a
non-ideal bias alone (i.e., no ideal bias, red curve) results
in a normalized variance of more than 0.8. We can estimate
the strength of this over-approximation as 0.75np/2. This
results from the fact that for every two pulses guessed by
an attacker, we omit the possibility of two wrong guesses,
an event with probability 0.25. By comparing this value
to the bit-equivalent MTAC security level of 2−nb , we can
see that an over-approximation with ρ = 0.2 is actually
stronger than the bit-equivalent MTAC target security level
for modulations with nppb > 2
log(0.5)
log(0.75) ≈ 4.82, i.e., at least
five pulses per bit. A decrease of the relative variance to
0.8 or, equivalently, an ideal bias of ρ = 0.2 are, therefore,
very strong over-approximations, i.e., on the order of the
(receiver-side) security parameter, that become even stronger
(less likely) for modulations over longer communication
distances.
5. Existing MTACs
Based on our insights on the attack, we need an MTAC to
verify the physical-layer integrity of a signal by measuring
the (normalized) signal residual variance. To the best of
our knowledge, there are three existing classes of MTACs
that, as we argue, aim for this implicitly. Each class is
parametrized by a performance parameter that allows to trade
off performance and security. Note that, in the following,
the robustness definition does not directly apply to the first
two classes since those do not entail reliable information
transmission.
5.1. Sequences of single-pulse bits
To allow for longer range while using short symbols, one
could encode each bit as a single pulse and tolerate up to a
certain pre-configured rate of bit errors TBER in the verifi-
cation step, as is currently proposed in 802.15.4z LRP [37].
This results in a secure MTAC under the condition that the
message m is pre-shared between transmitter and receiver.
Since relying on a single pulse makes bit transmission
unreliable, this is a purely physical-layer construct and
does not allow for integrity-protected data transmission. In
particular, a MAC will fail if there is a nonzero number of
expected bit errors per message. The resulting security and
performance level both depend on the BER tolerance level.
For c← m ⊕ x, where x is an ideal random sequence, the
attacker’s advantage can be estimated using Sanov’s theorem,
provided in [38], as
P (Xnp ≥ (1− TBER)) = 2−npDKL(P ||S).
Here, P and S capture the empirical and theoretical bi-
nomial distributions, with P = (1 − TBER, TBER) and
S = (0.5, 0.5), respectively. The random variable Xnp
denotes the number of bits guessed correctly by the attacker.
For TBER < 1, we can achieve any concrete security goal by
setting np appropriately. For example, under the assumption
of ideal randomness and an unbounded adversary, for α = 0
and δ = 1, we achieve 32 bits of security by transmitting
116 bits while tolerating up to TBER = 20% bit errors.
These results directly translate to a computational setting
with reduced shared randomness by replacing the ideal
randomness with the output of a PRF.
5.2. Correlation sequences
A standard way of signal time acquisition is correlating an
incoming signal with the expected signal shape and locking
to the peak. This is suggested in current 802.15.4z HRP
standardization efforts by means of a so-called Scrambled
Timestamp Sequence (STS) [37]. One could argue that secure
ToA verification could be achieved by checking for this peak.
However, we know that tests for time acquisition and content
verification should not be naively coupled [36]. If only used
for content verification, the security of such an approach
depends on the detailed test the receiver applies, i.e., the
degree to which the relative quality of the peak (peak-to-
average ratio) is considered. The power level at the peak
itself can be easily steered to the desired value by an attacker
relying on a power-increase strategy. Therefore, tests based
on a) the existence of a correlation peak or b) the peak power
level are not secure. Further exploration of this technique is
deferred to future work.
5.3. Hidden encodings: UWB-PR
Secure ToA-verification based on the bit-level content
can be achieved by hiding the mapping from pulses to bits
as in [24]. This can be thought of a scheme that reorders
the pulses belonging to each bit within the frame. This is
currently the only scheme that is implemented and secure.
It forces the adversary to transmit a small number of pulses,
and, in case their polarity is correct, hope that they align with
the bits. The authors analyze the performance and security
of such an attack model. The adversary is given the same
capabilities as assumed in Section 3.1. They have analyzed
attack strategies for α = 0 and δ = 1, and have assumed
that the communicating parties share large amounts of ideal
randomness. However, a formal proof is needed to determine
if the attack strategy is optimal. The results show that 16
pulses per bit are required under LoS conditions to prevent
bit errors over a distance of 92m. For 32 bits of security
at least 100 bits have to be sent in a message. As long as
the attacker does not guess all but nppb pulses correctly, he
has an advantage less than one, due to his uncertainty about
the reordering. Consequently, under this assumption, we can
add more bits to the frame to achieve any concrete security
level.
6. Variance-Based MTAC
In the following, we propose the Variance-Based MTAC
for direct variance estimation, consisting of rules for signal
creation and a receiver-side verification procedure. We then
embed this technique into a generic verification algorithm
and address side requirements for its practical instantiation.
6.1. Tx-side signal generation (Gen , Mtac)
We assume each sample to follow a binary encoding,
achieved either through on-off keying (OOK), frequency-shift
keying (FSK) or phase-shift keying (PSK), but not pulse-
position modulation (PPM). The reason is that, in PPM, the
fundamental signal contribution representing each sample
becomes vulnerable to ED/LC. Within our assumptions about
the modulation, we can represent the transmit signal as a
binary pulse sequence of length np = nppb ·nb. In particular,
we assume that pulses are separated by more than the channel
delay spread, i.e., there is no inter-pulse interference. Without
this assumption, signal degradation under benign conditions
might be hard to distinguish from attacks. The bits are
first encoded in a frame b = (sb1‖ . . . ‖sbnb ), consisting
of symbols that each represent message bit under repetition
coding, either as s1 = {1}nppb or s0 = {−1}nppb . Preventing
an attacker from inferring pulse polarities from either the
content of the message m or past samples is achieved by
relying on full pulse-level randomization, i.e., by applying a
secret sequence x on the pulses, as in
c = b⊕ x.
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Figure 10. Tx/Rx structure of a Variance-Based MTAC. A keyed XOR and
a secure distortion test are the central security components. For simplicity,
we omit the modulation of each value in c onto a UWB pulse in the picture.
Bit encoding and decoding are parametrized by a performance level p,
whereas the secure distortion test applies to an entire performance region
P .
We can either idealize x being perfectly random, as in
x← {−1, 1}np ,
and shared between transmitter and receiver, or being gen-
erated using a pseudorandom function that operates on a
previously shared secret.
6.2. Rx-side operations (Vrfy)
A message time of arrival code has to combine bit detec-
tion and verification with an additional signal verification for
ensuring the correct signal time of arrival. The bit-level tests
are a sequence of binary hypothesis tests. The additional
check is a single binary test applied to the entire signal,
parametrized by the bits received. We illustrate the whole
pipeline in Figure 10.
Bit detection. Each bit is carried by nppb pulses. The
receiver combines the energy of those pulses subject to
the bit-wise hypothesis and the XOR-mask and applies a
binary hypothesis-test per bit. The outcome is a received bit
sequence m′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
nb
).
Signal residual extraction. In order to test the signal
integrity on the physical layer, we need to extract the signal-
level residual. We exemplify the residual extraction at the
receiver in Figure 11. Under our stated assumptions about
channel and modulation, the received signal c′ consists of
the actual signal c, attenuated by path loss, as well as
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). At the receiver,
the expected pulse polarity sequence (i.e., the template) cˆ
is constructed based on the detected bits b′i and the shared
XOR-sequence x, as in cˆ = (sb′1‖ . . . ‖sb′nb )⊕x. We refer to
this step as template generation in Figure 10. The receiver-
side equivalent pulse train is then given by the element-wise
multiplication of the received signal with the expected pulse
polarity sequence cˆ, as p′ = c′  cˆ. The residual is then
obtained by subtracting the expected value from the receiver-
side equivalent pulse train, as in r = p′ − µp′ . A variance-
based hypothesis test is concerned with whether the receive
signal error consists of model error only or also contains an
attacker error. As we argue in Section 4, the property to test
for is the variance of the signal residual, i.e., if the variance
matches the expected noise or is too large, i.e., was caused
by attacker errors. However, we require some normalization
since the overall receive SNR will vary.
Secure distortion test. We need to normalize the observed
signal error to the overall signal energy. This way, we do not
need to maintain an explicit noise estimate. The worst-case
SNR is found by maximizing over the performance region P ,
guiding the choice of a threshold for the legitimate distortion.
We are then able to check if the observed distortion, i.e., the
overall normalized signal error, is within this bound.
This involves a hypothesis test on the normalized variance
of the received signal, after being XOR-ed with the expected
sequence. As secure distortion function, we propose taking
the ratio between the power of the signal residual and the
overall received power:
D = r
2
‖c′‖2 =
σ2p′
‖c′‖2 =
∑
i
(
c′[i]cˆ[i]−
∑
j c
′[j]cˆ[j]
np
)2
‖c′‖2
The distortion can be interpreted as the inverse of a receive
SNR estimate, based on a hypothesis on the pulse-level
structure of the received signal. A random, zero-mean process
will, for instance, evaluate to a distortion of D = 1.
Consequently, we can write the hypothesis test given by
Vrfy as a decision between a signal containing some of the
expected structure
H0 : D < 1,
and the signal being only (attacker-induced) random noise:
H1 : D = 1.
Performance region, decision threshold. We assume the
transmitter to choose the number of pulses per bit ap-
propriately given a previously selected performance level
p = (d′,BER′,Γ′nlos), p ∈ P , i.e., such that
Q
(√
nppbPrx(d′,Γ′nlos)
σ2n
)
!≤ BER′.
To satisfy our robustness criterion, the maximum legiti-
mate signal distortion needs to be chosen such that the false
negative rate does not exceed the underlying frame error
rate, i.e.,
TD(p) = max (T ′D ∈ [0, 1]) , s.t. P [Dlgt > T ′D]
!≤ FER.
The effective threshold is then chosen as the maxi-
mum threshold over the entire performance region, i.e.,
TˆD = maxp∈P TD(p). As a result, TˆD results in a robust
test under any performance tradeoff within the performance
region P .
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Figure 11. Legitimate (blue) and attack (red) signals in a scenario with four bits and 10 bits per symbol and repetition coding. The first plot shows the
shape of the transmitted signal. The attack signal is winning since each bit contains sufficient power, despite the attacker only guessing 2 out of 10 pulses
per symbol. The second plot shows the noisy signals at the receiver. The third plot shows the received signal after removing the data modulation. The
residual after the expected signal component has been removed is shown in the rightmost plot. It becomes evident that the attack residual can be discerned
easily from the legitimate residual, despite the attack on repetition coding (i.e., the bit level) being successful.
6.3. Variance-Based MTAC: Summary
To summarize and illustrate how to embed the Variance-
Based MTAC into a distance-measurement system, we high-
light the steps involved in the detection of an advancement
attack by a receiver (Rx) on a signal originating from a
transmitter (Tx).
(a) Pre-configuration
1) Rx determines the maximum accepted distortion
threshold TˆD based on the maximum communication
distance and maximum tolerated noise level, subject
to a performance region P .
(b) Key generation (Gen)
1) Tx and Rx derive a fresh pseudorandom XOR
sequence x from some shared secret. x could
theoretically also be secretly shared before each
round8.
(c) Mtac generation (Mtac)
1) Tx encodes the message m using repetition coding
according to a chosen configuration p ∈ P and
applies the XOR sequence.
(d) Mtac verification (Vrfy)
1) Rx constructs the message m′ by multiplying the
received pulse sequence c′ with the expected XOR
sequence and applying a bit-wise binary hypothesis
test on the overall symbol energy.
2) Based on the received message m′ and the XOR
sequence, Rx constructs the expected pulse-level
sequence cˆ (i.e., the template).
3) Rx computes the signal distortion D(c′, cˆ) between
received and expected pulse sequence.
4) Rx checks if D exceeds TˆD. If so, it declares attack.
6.4. Practical concerns
Time reference: Distance commitment. We assume the de-
tection of an advancement attack to be limited to verification
8. We don’t have any requirements on ToA protection in this step.
of the data relative to some established time frame. This can
be achieved by a distance commitment as introduced in [16].
This means the prover is assumed to have already responded
in quick fashion to the query by transmitting a deterministic
preamble, i.e., is committed to certain temporal reference.
Relative to this temporal reference, the prover then has to
deliver the secret information (i.e., m, correctly modulated)
at a pre-agreed time relative to the preamble. It is realistic
to assume a channel to be coherent throughout the frame, as
the duration of a UWB frame used for distance measurement
is typically less than 1ms. Through a distance commitment,
the vulnerabilities of a back-search [36] on the data-bearing
part can be avoided.
Ranging precision. Under a distance commitment, the back-
search for the acquisition of the first signal path is only
necessary on the preamble of the frame. Therefore, the
precision of the ranging procedure is not determined by
any operation applied to the data-bearing part. Consequently,
the precision of our proposal cannot be worse than that of
existing schemes relying on a distance commitment. It has
been shown that such a system can achieve a precision of
10cm, irrespective of communication distance [19], [24].
Bit-level security. We assume a bit-level procedure to detect
if the received bits m′ do not match the transmitted message
m. This could be achieved by a message authentication code
(MAC) appended to the frame or even transmitted on a
separate, potentially ToA-agnostic channel.
7. Analysis
In the following, we explore the tradeoff between security
and performance by modeling the effect of the channel and
evaluating the classification performance of our Variance-
Based MTAC from the previous section. The results are
based on simulations, which, however, make assumptions in
line with realistic UWB-based distance measurement systems.
From these results, we can derive the performance region
in which our proposal maintains bit-equivalent security (i.e.,
Adv(Aˆ) < 2−nb) and how to scale to longer distances.
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Figure 12. The number of pulses per symbol as a function of the target
performance level, i.e., the target bit error rate (BER) and operating distance
under FCC/ETSI constraints. These numbers refer to a LoS (left) as well
as a NLoS scenario (right) with 20dB attenuation of the direct path. Lower
BERs over longer distances require more pulses per symbol.
7.1. Model
Path loss model. To evaluate the impact of distance on a) the
modulation required and b) the implications on security, we
assume a free-space path loss model. This means the received
power degrades inversely to the square of the distance, as in
Prx = Ptx
(
λ
4pid
)2
Γnlos.
We assume the antennas to be operated in each other’s far
field, as the goal of this analysis is to understand the tension
between long distance and security. As input power, we
rely on the constraints put forward by the FCC and ETSI
regarding UWB in licensed spectrum. This is, a maximum
peak power of 0dBm within the 50MHz around the peak
and an average limitation on signal power spectral density
of -41.3dBm/Hz. We assume that our pulses are sufficiently
spaced, such that each pulse can be sent at peak power.
We assume a signal bandwidth of 620MHz at a center
frequency of 6681.6MHz, which is a typical UWB channel
configuration [37]. For receiver-side noise, we consider
the thermal noise figure at room temperature, given by
-174dBm/Hz. In a separate non-line-of-sight (NLoS) scenario,
we assume an additional attenuation of 20dB which is roughly
the attenuation the signal experiences when traversing the
human body. In Figure 12, we show the number of pulses per
symbol required under both LoS and NLoS conditions. The
required number of pulses increases with longer distances
and decreases if the requirement on target BER gets relaxed.
Gaussian model for variance distributions. The variance
constitutes a sum of np independent random variables. Due
to the central limit theorem, for a sufficiently high overall
number of pulses, the variance distribution converges to a
Gaussian, i.e.,
DAˆ(d) ∼ N
(
µDAˆ(d), σDAˆ(d)
)
(2)
Dlgt(d) ∼ N
(
µDlgt(d), σDlgt(d)
)
. (3)
In general, these distributions are a function of the communi-
cation range as well as the target BER. Through simulations,
we can verify that in the area of interest (i.e., where the
distributions significantly overlap), these distributions indeed
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Figure 13. Over longer distances, the legitimate distortion increases. The
gap between maximum legitimate distortion and minimum attack distortion
becomes smaller for longer distances, eventually vanishing altogether. This
means, under our strong attacker model, MTAC security can only be
maintained up to some distance.
fit a Gaussian hypothesis well, as we show in detail in
Appendix C.
7.2. Results
We model the bit error rate of the underlying modulation
according to Equation 1. We simulate this in MATLAB for
a frame of 32 bits. As we detail in Appendix D, the security
guarantees are maintained for longer frames. For robustness,
the choice of the decision threshold should result in the
same false negative rate of Vrfy as under bit-wise detection,
i.e., FNRVrfy
!
= 1 − (1 − BER)nb . Under the Gaussian
hypothesis for the distortion distribution, we can derive the
practical decision threshold by choosing it Q−1(FNRVrfy)
normalized standard deviations above the expected legitimate
distortion. The resulting threshold is indicated in Figure 13.
We evaluate the probability of attacker success for a given
maximum communication distance based on the attacker’s
best case statistics and the legitimate worst-case statistics,
over a range of target BER values. This is in line with our
attacker model, which does not make any assumptions about
the attacker’s position. For a given performance region, the
upper bound of the attacker’s advantage is given by
Adv(Aˆ) = Q
(
µˆDAˆ − (µˆDlgt +Q−1(FNRVrfy) · σˆDlgt)
σˆDAˆ
)
,
whereas the statistical parameters, i.e., means and vari-
ances, are chosen in favor of forger Aˆ. Specifically, we
choose the attacker’s parameters under minimization of the
worst-case distortion and the parameters of the legitimate
transmitter under maximization of the distortion, within the
defined performance region. The details of those choices
we provide in Appendix B. Unsurprisingly, the worst-case
distance for the legitimate transmitter amounts typically to the
maximum distance. The numerical values of those statistical
parameters (i.e., means and variances) were obtained through
simulation. We thereby modeled the attacker as having an
ideal pulse-level bias of 20%, as motivated in Section 4. In
the following, we are interested in the performance region
in which the MTAC provides bit-equivalent security, i.e.,
Adv(Aˆ) ≤ 2−nb .
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Figure 14. Attacker’s advantage as a function of the performance level.
We highlight the performance region within which the MTAC provides
bit-equivalent security. The secure distortion test provides us with a bit-
equivalently secure MTAC for distances up to 200m and 20m for LoS and
NLoS scenarios, respectively.
Performance-equivalent MTAC region. Figure 14 shows
the attacker’s advantage as a function of the performance
level. The figure highlights the performance region in which
we have bit-equivalent MTAC security.
Observation 5 Under any tradeoff between symbol length
and target bit error rate: For any frame m of at least 32
bits, we can find a distortion threshold TˆD resulting in an
MTAC with bit-equivalent security for distances up to 200m
under LoS conditions and up to 20m under NLoS conditions.
Extending the MTAC region. By comparing the results for
LoS and NLoS conditions, we see that the MTAC region
seems to degrade proportionally to the attenuation added,
i.e., the results are invariant under amplification/attenuation.
This means we can extrapolate to any communication range
if we allocate a security link margin Γsec ≥ 0 satisfying
Γsec
!≥ 20 · log10
(
dmax
200m
)
+ Γnlos.
8. Conclusion
With MTAC, we propose a physical-layer primitive for
secure distance measurement. We formally define the security
of its underlying algorithms. We then derive design principles
for the practical instantiation of an MTAC: A randomized
pulse sequence and a secure distortion test over the entire
signal. The results indicate that the bit-equivalent security
level can be regained over a meaningful performance region,
thereby resulting in a fundamental building block preventing
any physical-layer, distance-reducing attacks.
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Appendix A.
Lessons Learned
Since our proposal provides a fundamentally secure
physical-layer building block for ToA measurement, this
changes prevailing assumptions on the design of higher level
protocols. In [21], Clulow et al. put forward principles for
distance bounding:
”We propose a number of principles to adhere
to when implementing distance-bounding systems.
These restrict the choice of the communication
medium to speed-of-light channels, the communi-
cation format to single bit exchanges for timing,
symbol length to narrow (ultra wideband) pulses,
and protocols to error-tolerant versions. These
restrictions increase the technical challenge of
implementing secure distance bounding.”
Given the above designs, these recommendations don’t
seem to hold up. Also, the recommendation to single bit
timing is not only not needed but also are fairly wasteful.
Again, from [21]:
”We show that proposed distance-bounding proto-
cols of Hu, Perrig, and Johnson (2003), Sastry,
Shankar and Wagner (2003), and Cˇapkun and
Hubaux (2005, 2006) are vulnerable to a guessing
attack where the malicious prover preemptively
transmits guessed values for a number of response
bits.”
In this work, we show that these vulnerabilities are an
artifact of a somewhat naively designed physical layer and
modulation, and can be addressed purely on the physical layer.
The problem and its solution are orthogonal to the design and
security of the protocol that builds in it, which operates on a
different level of abstraction, making different assumptions
about the security parameter (i.e., the bits) making up the
nonces. These protocols not addressing the physical layer
does not mean they are necessarily vulnerable. If coupled
with a physical layer that is in line with our design, they are
secure, within the performance region we point out.
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Figure 15. Attacker’s advantage as a function of the performance level for
LoS conditions under a Gaussian extrapolation (left) and fully empirical
simulation (right). Overall, the empirical result is very similar, in particular
its MTAC region is not smaller than the one resulting from the Gaussian
model.
Appendix B.
Attacker Statistical Parameters
We choose the attacker’s parameters under minimization
of the worst-case distortion, i.e., as
(µˆDAˆ , σˆDAˆ) = (µDAˆ(dAˆ,ideal), σDAˆ(dAˆ,ideal))
dAˆ,ideal = arg min
d∈[0,dmax]
µDAˆ(d)− σDAˆ(d),
and the parameters of the legitimate transmitter under maxi-
mization of the distortion, within the defined performance
region, i.e., as
(µˆDlgt , σˆDlgt) = (µDlgt(dlgt,worst), σDlgt(dlgt,worst))
dlgt,worst = arg max
d∈[0,dmax]
µDlgt(d) + σDlgt(d).
Appendix C.
Validating the Gaussian Variance Model
In the following, we motivate the Gaussian model for
the distortion distribution put forward in Equations 2 and 3.
C.1. Extrapolation vs. fully empirical results
In the following, we compare our extrapolated results
from Section 7 to a fully empirical (i.e., Monte-Carlo)
simulation. The probability of winning as a function of the
performance level is shown in Figure 15 for LoS conditions
and Figure 16 for NLoS conditions. Both results refer to
a frame of 20 bits. For both scenarios, we see that the
the attacker’s advantage evolves almost identically. We see
that the fully empirical results indicate a slightly wider
MTAC region, which suggest our Gaussian model to be
a conservative estimate.
C.2. Variance distribution is sufficiently Gaussian
We provide quantile-quantile (QQ) plots that compare
the empirical distributions against normal distributions. This
allows to validate the model we use in Section 7 which serves
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Figure 16. Attacker’s advantage as a function of the performance level for
NLoS conditions under a Gaussian extrapolation (left) and fully empirical
simulation (right). Overall, the empirical result is very similar, in particular
its MTAC region is not smaller than the one resulting from the Gaussian
model.
extrapolate the empirical classification performance to small
likelihoods. We provide those plots for a frame of 32 bits
and a selection of communication distances, both for LoS
and NLoS scenarios. Figure 17 presents those results for the
attacker’s variance distribution. The relevant distance for the
resulting MTAC region boundary is around 100m for LoS
and around 10m for NLoS. This is the distance at which the
distortion for the attacker is minimal, see Figure 13. There
is a slight downwards bend of the empirical value for higher
quantiles. This means, a slightly bit more than expected high-
variance outliers compared to the Gaussian hypothesis. This
is in line with our requirements, i.e., the normal estimate
being conservative regarding distinguishability. The plots for
those distances show that the empirical quantiles are well
aligned with the straight diagonal. Figure 18 presents those
results for the attacker’s distortion distribution. The relevant
distance for the resulting MTAC boundary is around 200m
for LoS and around 20m for NLoS, i.e., mid-range. The plots
for those distances show that the empirical quantiles are well
aligned with the straight line at those distances relevant for
the MTAC region derived in Section 7.
Appendix D.
Effect of Frame Length
Figure 19 shows the security level for one particular
distance as a function of the frame length. It becomes evident
that bit-level equivalence of the security level is maintianed
as the length of the frame increases. We see that attacker’s
advantage decays faster than 2−nb .
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Figure 17. QQ plots comparing the attacker empirical distortion distribution for LoS (top) and NLoS (bottom) conditions for a frame of 32 bits and
different distances against a normal distribution. For validity of results w.r.t. the MTAC region boundary, the attack signal distortion at a distance of 100m
(LoS) and 10m (NLoS) should be close to a Gaussian. Indeed, the QQ plots of the second column are close to the diagonal.
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Figure 18. QQ plots comparing the legitimate empirical distortion distribution for LoS (top) and NLoS (bottom) conditions for a frame of 32 bits and
different distances against a normal distribution. For validity of results w.r.t. the MTAC region boundary, the attack signal distortion at a distance of 200m
(LoS) and 20m (NLoS) should be close to a Gaussian. Indeed, the QQ plots of the third column are close to the diagonal.
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Figure 19. The attacker’s advantage decreases faster than the bit-equivalent
MTAC security level for longer frames. This means the security guarantees
for shorter frames are maintained for longer frames.
